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International Law
A Roadmap for Foreign Official Immunity in U.S. Courts
Chimène I. Keitner1
Introduction
More than a decade ago, Samantar v. Yousuf2 tore up the map
that many courts had been following in cases involving foreign
official immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which governs civil
proceedings against foreign states and their agencies and
instrumentalities, does not apply to foreign officials. Instead, the
immunity of foreign officials “is properly governed by the
common law.”3 But the Court provided no guidance on the
common law’s substance or where courts should look to find it.
This chapter provides an essential roadmap for courts faced
with claims against foreign officials who argue that the claims
should be dismissed because of the positions they hold or because
they acted in an official capacity. U.S. courts should decide
questions of foreign official immunity by applying relevant
statutes and rules of federal common law. These common-law
rules should not grant more immunity than customary
international law clearly requires. Courts should give substantial
deference to the State Department’s interpretations of
international law, but they are not bound to follow the State
Department’s determinations of immunity in individual cases or
its articulations of general principles. Foreign official immunity
should be treated as an affirmative defense with the burden of
proof on the defendant. But it must also be treated as a threshold
question and one that is immediately appealable to spare officials
entitled to immunity from the burdens of litigation.

1

Excerpted and adapted from William S. Dodge & Chimène I. Keitner,
A Roadmap for Foreign Official Immunity Cases in U.S. Courts, 90
FORDHAM L. REV. 677 (2021).
2
560 U.S. 305 (2010).
3
Id. at 325.
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Foreign Official Immunity Today
The U.S. law of foreign official immunity comes from several
different sources. Diplomatic and consular immunities are
codified in treaties and implemented by statutes. Head-of-state
immunity and conduct-based immunity are governed by
customary international law4 and implemented by federal
common law. Samantar further clarified that the FSIA will apply
to certain suits against foreign officials if the foreign state is the
“real party in interest.”5
A. Diplomatic, Consular, and Other Treaty-Based Immunities
Treaties and statutes now govern many immunities accorded
foreign officials in domestic courts. These include diplomatic
immunity, consular immunity, and immunities for officials of the
United Nations and other international organizations. Some of
these immunities are principally status-based, whereas others are
principally conduct-based.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR),
implemented by the Diplomatic Relations Act,6 governs
diplomatic immunity in U.S. courts. Generally, diplomats enjoy
absolute status-based immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state, and near-absolute status-based immunity from
civil and administrative proceedings. The State Department’s
certification of an individual’s diplomatic status is conclusive.
Diplomatic immunity shields an individual from legal
proceedings even if the proceedings began before that status was
acquired. When immunity applies, the receiving state can request
that the sending state waive the diplomat’s immunity. It can also
declare the diplomat “persona non grata” and expel the diplomat
from its territory. As with other forms of status-based immunity,
former diplomats do not enjoy absolute immunity, but they do
enjoy residual conduct-based immunity for acts performed “in the
exercise of [their] functions as . . . member[s] of the mission.”7
4

See generally Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
5
Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325.
6
22 U.S.C. § 254(a)–(e).
7
VCDR, art. 39(2).
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Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR), consular officials, unlike diplomats, enjoy immunity
only for acts performed in the exercise of their consular functions.8
Delineating the scope of functional immunity has proved
somewhat easier for consular officials than for diplomatic officials
because consular functions can be enumerated with greater
specificity and “are for the most part less sensitive than the
functions of diplomats.”9 The State Department guide on
diplomatic and consular immunity makes clear that “[n]o law
enforcement officer, U.S. Department of State officer, diplomatic
mission, or consulate is authorized to determine whether a given
set of circumstances constitutes an official act” for immunity
purposes.10 Rather, “[t]his is an issue which may only be resolved
by the court with subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged
crime.”11
B. Head-of-State Immunity
Sitting heads of state, heads of government, and foreign
ministers are absolutely immune from suit during their terms of
office. Head-of-state immunity is a status-based immunity
(immunity ratione personae) that attaches to these officials while
they occupy these positions “to ensure the effective performance
of their functions on behalf of their respective States.”12 Head-ofstate immunity is absolute in that it applies to all acts, including
those taken in a private capacity and those performed before the
official assumed office. But absolute immunity lasts only during
the official’s tenure in office.

8

VCCR, art. 43.
Eileen Denza, Diplomatic and Consular Immunities: Trends and
Challenges, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF IMMUNITIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 433, 435 (Tom Ruys et al. eds. 2019).
10
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFF. OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, DIPLOMATIC
AND CONSULAR IMMUNITY: GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES 11 (2018), https://perma.cc/SN8J-5MEY.
11
Id.
12
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 53 (Feb. 14).
9
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C. Conduct-Based Immunity
A foreign official who is not entitled to head-of-state,
diplomatic, or consular immunity is still immune from
proceedings based on “acts taken in his official capacity.”13 This
conduct-based immunity turns on the nature of the conduct, rather
than on the status of the official. Because it does not depend on an
official’s status, conduct-based immunity continues after an
official leaves office.
Whether a foreign official was acting in an official capacity
for purposes of conduct-based immunity depends in part on the
scope of the official’s authority under foreign law. In some cases,
foreign governments have confirmed that their officials were
acting within their authority, and U.S. courts have given such
statements significant weight. If disputed by the plaintiff,
however, the question of an official’s authority under foreign law
is a question of law for a U.S. court to decide.14 If the foreign state
indicates that the official was not acting in an official capacity, or
if the foreign state waives the official’s immunity, then there is no
basis for a court to find conduct-based immunity.
The more difficult question is whether to treat certain acts as
beyond an official’s capacity for purposes of conduct-based
immunity even if those acts were authorized by the official’s
government. Not all acts authorized by foreign governments
benefit from conduct-based immunity under international law.
Many countries have denied immunity to officials alleged to have
violated universally accepted prohibitions on torture, genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, or to have committed
acts of espionage, sabotage, and kidnapping.
Courts have struggled to define “official capacity” because
“the phrase may have a different meaning and scope depending on

13

Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 322 (2010).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. Cf. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei
Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018) (stating, in a
nonimmunity case, that although a federal court should give “respectful
consideration” to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law,
the court “is not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign
government’s statements”).
14
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the context.”15 For conduct-based immunity, whether an act is
taken in an “official capacity” does not depend on whether the act
is attributable to the state for purposes of state responsibility. Nor
does it depend on whether the act meets the state-action
requirement for some human rights norms. Instead, determining
whether an act was committed in an official’s “official capacity”
depends upon how states treat this concept in the context of
conduct-based immunity.
Courts also choose different starting-points for evaluating
state practice. Some start from a baseline of immunity and look
for state practice and opinio juris establishing exceptions. Others
start from a baseline of jurisdiction and look for state practice and
opinio juris establishing a customary international law
requirement of immunity. The latter approach is more consistent
with how U.S. courts have analyzed immunity since the founding
era.16 As a policy matter, it is also more consistent with the postwar recognition that state officials can bear personal responsibility
under international law for egregious conduct even if the state
itself is also legally responsible for the same conduct. An approach
that equates the official’s immunity with the state’s immunity in
all cases, absent an explicit waiver by the foreign state, rests on an
outdated conception of state action that erases the individual
actor’s moral agency. Such an approach also undermines the
ability of foreign courts to enforce universally accepted rules of
conduct where forum law would otherwise permit adjudication.
The Role of the Executive Branch
In the evolving landscape of foreign official immunity, one of
the most important—and most contested—issues is the proper role
of the executive branch in making case-specific immunity
determinations and in articulating principles of conduct-based
immunity for courts to apply. Although the State Department’s
15

William S. Dodge, Foreign Official Immunity in the International Law
Commission: The Meanings of Official Capacity, 109 AJIL UNBOUND
156, 157 (2015).
16
See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 136 (1812) (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory
is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation
not imposed by itself.”).
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role confirming a foreign official’s entitlement to status-based
immunity is well accepted, the executive branch’s assertion of
lawmaking authority over conduct-based immunity remains
contested in the post-Samantar era.
Whether an act is taken in an “official capacity” for immunity
purposes turns on questions of international law, foreign law, U.S.
law, and fact. While the State Department has expertise on
questions of international law, courts have expertise deciding
questions of foreign law, U.S. law, and fact. The executive branch
claims that its power to conduct foreign affairs gives it
constitutional authority to issue binding case-specific suggestions
of conduct-based immunity. As a practical matter, however, the
U.S. experience with immunity from the founding to the FSIA
shows that case-specific executive authority leads to political
pressure, inconsistent determinations, and harm to U.S. foreign
relations. Further, allowing the executive branch to dictate the
outcome of specific cases would create separation-of-powers
tensions with the judiciary’s role of adjudication.17 Finally, the
executive branch’s claim of constitutional authority to articulate
binding legal principles that govern foreign official immunity also
lacks support. As Samantar held, the conduct-based immunity of
foreign officials not covered by existing statutes and treaties “is
properly governed by the common law,” a source of law based on
judicial, not executive, authority.18
Undoubtedly, the executive branch will have considerable
influence over the federal common law of foreign official
immunity. Courts can and should give substantial deference to
State Department interpretations of customary international law
on foreign official immunity. But in the U.S. constitutional
system, the executive branch does not make rules of federal
common law; federal courts do.

17

See Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official
Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 72 (2010); see also Curtis A. Bradley,
Conflicting Approaches to the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official
Immunity, 115 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2021) (noting “potential separation
of powers concerns”).
18
See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S.
Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915,
954–67 (2011).

Vol. 6

The Judges’ Book

103

Procedural Questions
Samantar’s holding that the FSIA does not apply to suits
against foreign officials unless the requested relief would run
against the foreign state implicates a range of procedural issues.
A. Jurisdiction and Service of Process
Because the FSIA’s provisions on service do not apply to most
suits against foreign officials, the plaintiff must serve the foreign
official with process under other rules. In federal court, plaintiffs
must rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) for service in
the United States and on Rule 4(f) for service outside the United
States. In state court, plaintiffs must rely on state rules for service.
In some cases, serving a foreign official under these rules is easier
for plaintiffs because the FSIA’s rules can be quite demanding.
But in other cases, serving a foreign official abroad under the
Federal Rules has proved difficult.
The court must also have personal jurisdiction over the
foreign official, subject to the limits imposed by the applicable
Due Process Clause. Because the FSIA provisions on personal
jurisdiction will not usually apply, the court’s personal
jurisdiction will depend upon the official’s contacts with the
forum. Some claims against foreign officials arise out of sufficient
contacts with the forum to support the exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction. But in other cases, the court is unlikely to
have personal jurisdiction unless the defendant can be served with
process in the forum. Lack of personal jurisdiction will be a
substantial barrier to suit in many cases against foreign officials.
B. Pleading Immunity
The best way of characterizing foreign official immunity is as
an affirmative defense. Courts treated claims of conduct-based
immunity as an affirmative defense during the early years of the
republic, and at least some courts characterized sovereign
immunity as an affirmative defense during the pre-FSIA period.
Indeed, this is precisely how a State Department guide for law
enforcement treats the conduct-based immunity of consular
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officers today.19 Treating foreign official immunity as an
affirmative defense is consistent with the proposition that it can be
waived. It is also consistent with the way courts have treated other
rules of federal common law, such as the act-of-state doctrine.20
Further, it might be the only way to explain why the federal rule
of foreign official immunity binds state courts, because rules of
federal common law generally do not limit either the personal or
the subject-matter jurisdiction of state courts. This argument also
finds support in an analogy to domestic official immunity, which
is an affirmative defense under federal law.21
C. Alternative Grounds for Dismissal
Because questions of foreign official immunity sometimes
involve difficult questions of fact or law, courts should also
consider alternative grounds for dismissal. In a pre-Samantar case
applying the FSIA to a suit against foreign officials, the D.C.
Circuit held that the district court erred by failing to consider
“other potentially dispositive jurisdictional defenses.”22 The court
observed:
Immunity should reduce the expenses, in time and
inconvenience, imposed on foreign sovereigns by litigation in
U.S. courts. . . . It would be bizarre if an assertion of immunity
worked to increase litigation costs via jurisdictional discovery,
to the neglect of swifter routes to dismissal.23

Other non-merits grounds for dismissal are available even if
foreign official immunity is jurisdictional. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that “a federal court has leeway to choose among
threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”24
Under this principle, a federal court may dismiss for lack of
19

See STATE DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 11, 22.
See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004)
(characterizing the act-of-state doctrine as “a substantive defense on the
merits”).
21
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
22
In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
23
Id.
24
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
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personal jurisdiction without reaching the question of subjectmatter jurisdiction. And a federal court may dismiss on grounds
of forum non conveniens without reaching either subject-matter
or personal jurisdiction. Even though most federal courts today
treat foreign official immunity as a question of subject-matter
jurisdiction, they may dismiss claims against foreign officials on
alternative, non-merits grounds without reaching the question of
immunity.
If foreign official immunity is characterized as an affirmative
defense, an important, additional ground for dismissal becomes
available: that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which
relief can be granted. To be clear, the basis of the plaintiff’s failure
to state a claim is not because the foreign official is entitled to
immunity25 but is rather irrespective of immunity. Under the
pleading standard adopted by the Supreme Court, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”26 Some complaints against foreign officials contain
no more than conclusory statements and fail to establish a
plausible claim under applicable law. In such cases, dismissal for
failure to state a claim may be the simplest ground on which to
dispose of a case.
D. Appealing Immunity Decisions
Regardless how immunity is characterized, all decisions on
foreign official immunity should be immediately appealable.
Decisions granting immunity are appealable as final decisions of
the district court.27 Decisions denying immunity, however, are not
final decisions. Because foreign official immunity is an immunity
from both liability and the burdens of litigation, immediate
appealability is necessary to ensure that immunity performs its
intended function.

25

Foreign official immunity can be raised on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim or on a motion for summary judgment before
filing an answer, even if it is treated as an affirmative defense.
26
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
27
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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Under the collateral-order doctrine, the Supreme Court has
recognized a small class of prejudgment orders that “are
immediately appealable because they finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until
the whole case is adjudicated.”28 The federal courts of appeals
have held that orders denying foreign state immunity under the
FSIA are immediately appealable because foreign state immunity,
which also “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability,” would be “effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial.”29 Decisions denying foreign official
immunity should be immediately appealable for the same reason.
Conclusion
Congress can address conduct-based, foreign official
immunity in a statute, as it has done for other forms of immunity.
Such legislation could answer both substantive and procedural
questions, providing clear directions for courts to follow. But until
Congress enacts such a statute, courts can still find their way with
a proper roadmap.
*

28

*

*

Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
29
Compania Mexicana De Aviacon, S.A. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 859 F.2d
1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988).

